The juntas of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have been vocal about their claims that the West is deliberately working to destabilize their military governments. This narrative has been echoed by Russian state media, bundling sanctions, frozen aid, and diplomatic isolation into a single story of conspiracy. However, a closer examination of the actions of Western countries reveals that what appears to be a strategy of destabilization may actually be a side effect of something else entirely.
The dependency of the Alliance of Sahel States on Russian military backing is well-documented. After France's Barkhane force withdrew from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in 2022-2023, and the US shut its Agadez base in 2024, the Wagner Group stepped in as a security guarantor. This arrangement was formalized in 2025 when Wagner folded into Africa Corps under Russia's defense ministry. While the juntas receive military backing, Moscow gains a geopolitical asset, including a foothold in Africa and leverage against the West.
The relationship between Mali and Russia is not a one-sided trade. While the juntas gain military support, they also understand that dependency on Russia does not mean exclusivity. Bamako has behaved accordingly, taking advantage of the gap between Western intention and outcome. The logic follows that if the West is squeezing Russia globally, and Sahelian regimes are tied to Russia's presence, then pressure on Moscow should ripple outward and hit those regimes too.
Between 2020 and 2024, the US, EU, and UK rolled out sanctions against Wagner-linked companies and individuals across Africa. However, these measures did not target the governments of Mali, Burkina Faso, or Niger directly. The US Treasury designated Wagner a transnational criminal organization in January 2023, framing the goal as countering "Russia's destabilizing activities in Africa." This response was aimed at Russian activity, not an independent plan targeting Sahelian states.
If destabilizing the AES regimes were an actual policy goal, one would expect consistency in Western actions, including sanctions, isolation, and a refusal to engage. However, the record from 2020 to 2026 shows the opposite. The United States, for example, lifted sanctions on three senior Malian officials in February 2026, including Defence Minister Sadio Camara, who had been sanctioned since 2023 for facilitating Wagner's operations.
The US government's actions demonstrate a mixed approach towards Mali. While the Treasury lifted sanctions on senior Malian officials, a State Department official met Mali's foreign minister, Abdoulaye Diop, in Bamako. Additionally, Reuters reported that Washington was nearing a deal to let US aircraft and drones resume intelligence-gathering flights over Malian territory against groups linked to al-Qaeda.
The sanctions relief carried no condition on Russia's withdrawal, and Africa Corps never left Mali. Sadio Camara, who had been sanctioned for facilitating Wagner's operations, continued to do business with both sides until his death on April 25, 2026. His interactions with both Western and Russian officials highlight the complexities of Mali's relationships with external actors.
Key points
- The West's actions towards Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger may not be a deliberate attempt to destabilize their governments, but rather a side effect of their policies towards Russia.
- Mali's government has taken advantage of the gap between Western intention and outcome, maintaining relationships with both Western and Russian officials.
- The dependency of the Alliance of Sahel States on Russian military backing has created a complex dynamic, with implications for regional stability.
