The global technology competition between the US and China has raised concerns about surveillance and data privacy. According to Daryl Swanepoel of the Inclusive Society, the implications of this competition are complex and far-reaching. The debate over Chinese technology is centered around whether Beijing can use Chinese-built telecommunications networks, cloud systems, and artificial-intelligence platforms to conduct surveillance. While it is technically possible, this perspective is incomplete, as the same question must be asked of the US.
Modern digital technology is not neutral infrastructure, and its capabilities can be influenced by the state. Telecommunications equipment processes traffic and metadata, cloud providers store information and control access to computing capacity, and AI companies process prompts, documents, and organisational data. Manufacturers can alter the behaviour of these systems through software and firmware updates. Any state that can compel, compromise, or cooperate with the companies controlling these technologies may gain access to valuable information.
Western security concerns about China are legitimate, citing Article 7 of China's National Intelligence Law, which requires organisations and citizens to support national intelligence work. Chinese state-sponsored cyber operations against telecommunications and critical infrastructure have been documented. A 2025 joint advisory issued by the US and international partners described Chinese-linked actors compromising networks worldwide to support an espionage system.
The technical risks associated with Chinese technology are credible, including remotely maintained software in telecommunications equipment and internet-connected drones that can transfer imagery and location information. However, these risks do not necessarily mean that every Chinese product contains a hidden backdoor or that all data passing through Chinese equipment is automatically delivered to Beijing.
The US presents itself as a trusted alternative to Chinese technology, but its own technology is not beyond the reach of the American state. The US openly conducts foreign electronic surveillance under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, targeting non-American persons outside the US with the compelled assistance of American electronic communications service providers.
The uncomfortable question arises: if China's ability to compel Chinese companies creates an unacceptable espionage risk, why should the American government's ability to compel American companies be treated as benign? While there are differences between the two countries' systems, including the level of transparency and oversight, the underlying risk remains.
The problem is not just surveillance but also technological dependence, which creates strategic leverage. A foreign power may restrict cloud services, revoke software licences, or withhold security updates, demonstrating how technological dominance can be converted into geopolitical power. This makes the UN Global Dialogue on AI Governance crucial in establishing a forum for countries to discuss the implications of technological competition.
Key points
- The global technology competition between the US and China raises concerns about surveillance and data privacy.
- The capabilities of modern digital technology can be influenced by the state, posing risks to data privacy.
- Technological dependence creates strategic leverage, which can be used by foreign powers.
