A recent study titled "The Impact of the October 1973 War on the Review of Israeli Military Policy" has shed light on the significant implications of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War on Israel's military strategy. The war, which began on October 6, 1973, was a comprehensive test of Israel's military system developed after the June 1967 war. The study highlights that Israel entered the war with a set of assumptions that ultimately proved flawed, including the notion that deterrence would prevent Arab states from going to war and that Israeli qualitative superiority would ensure a decisive outcome.
Prior to the October 1973 War, Israel's military policy was based on the concept of deterrence, which meant not only preventing war but also convincing the adversary that any renewed confrontation would end in a clear military defeat. The occupation of Sinai, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank provided Israel with geographical depth, creating a belief that this depth would offer additional time for warning and preparation. However, this assumption overlooked the fact that Egyptian and Syrian forces were already positioned along the new confrontation lines and no longer needed to cover the distances that had separated them from the battlefield before 1967.
The Israeli military strategy relied heavily on a relatively small standing army supported by a large reserve force that could be called up when needed. The success of this formula depended on an interconnected sequence: early warning enabling a rapid decision, followed by the mobilisation of reserves and their movement to the fronts, and then the transition from defence to counterattack. Air power also occupied a central position in this conception, as a principal instrument for rapidly achieving operational superiority and supporting ground forces.
The October 1973 War demonstrated that air superiority is not a fixed reality independent of the operational environment. Egypt's construction of a dense surface-to-air missile network, alongside its extensive use of anti-armour weapons, showed that it had developed means of temporarily neutralising Israeli strengths. The war exposed a problem in the relationship between the components of military power, rather than in each component individually. Deterrence had not prevented war; warning had not provided time; the reserves were not available at full effectiveness when required; air power could not operate as freely as expected.
The Egyptian-Syrian attack on October 6, 1973, struck the most sensitive link in the Israeli system: early warning. The problem was not a complete absence of information but the way it was interpreted. The Israeli establishment assumed that Egypt would not begin a war before acquiring certain capabilities that would enable it to confront Israeli air superiority, and that Syria would not wage a large-scale war alone. Consequently, indicators of Arab preparations were interpreted in accordance with prior assumptions, rather than as evidence that war was approaching.
The failure of Israeli military policy was rapidly apparent, as large-scale mobilisation was delayed, leaving the forces already deployed on the two fronts to confront a major offensive before the build-up was complete. In the Golan, the scale of the numerical disparity became apparent in the first hours, while Egyptian forces succeeded in crossing the Suez Canal and establishing bridgeheads on its eastern bank. This forced Israeli forces into a defensive position that their military policy had not been designed to confront.
The study concludes that the October crisis was less a crisis of insufficient weapons or personnel than a crisis in the employment of military power under conditions for which the military had not prepared. The war marked a significant turning point in Israeli military policy, highlighting the need for a more nuanced understanding of the operational environment and the limitations of military power. The study's findings remain relevant today, offering valuable insights into the complexities of military strategy and the importance of adaptability in the face of changing circumstances.
Key points
- The October 1973 war exposed flaws in Israel's strategic assumptions, including the effectiveness of deterrence and the role of geographical depth in providing warning time.
- The war highlighted the limitations of air power and the importance of a more nuanced understanding of the operational environment.
- The study's findings remain relevant today, offering valuable insights into the complexities of military strategy and the importance of adaptability.
