As Israel prepares for elections next month, the question is whether Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu can survive another political reckoning. However, the focus on Netanyahu may overshadow a more critical issue: will Israel leave Netanyahuism behind? Netanyahuism is a strategic doctrine that believes Israel can enjoy security without resolving the Palestinian question. This doctrine has been built on containing the Palestinians, deterring Iran and its allies, normalising relations with Arab governments, and integrating into the region without making territorial and political compromises.
For years, Netanyahuism seemed remarkably successful, with the Palestinian movement divided between a weak Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza. Israeli settlements expanded, and Arab governments focused on economic modernisation and technological cooperation. The Palestinian issue appeared to be losing its centrality. The Abraham Accords, which normalised relations between Israel and several Arab states, became the crowning achievement of this approach. However, the Hamas attack on 7 October 2023 exposed an intelligence and military failure and shattered the central assumption of Netanyahuism: that the Palestinian question could be managed indefinitely at an acceptable cost.
The conflict had not disappeared but was compressed, and when it returned, it did so with extraordinary violence. In most political systems, a strategic failure of this magnitude would trigger a fundamental reassessment. In Israel, however, it produced a paradox: Netanyahu's security doctrine was discredited, but the politics sustaining it became even stronger. The Israeli government used the war to postpone accountability, present criticism as disunity, and transform every debate over responsibility into a debate over national survival.
Netanyahu does not necessarily oppose every agreement with the Palestinians, having accepted ceasefires, prisoner exchanges, and limited diplomatic arrangements. He has also pursued normalisation with Arab states. However, these are instruments for managing Israel's external environment, not steps towards ending the conflict. A genuine settlement would require choices Netanyahuism was designed to avoid, such as restricting settlement expansion, accepting meaningful Palestinian sovereignty, and acknowledging that military dominance cannot substitute for political legitimacy.
The contradiction between Israel's need for peace and Netanyahuism's need for an unresolved conflict is structural. Israel may need peace, but Netanyahuism needs an unresolved conflict to reinforce its message, bind its political coalition, and allow its leaders to argue that this is no time for experiments or concessions. The upcoming elections in Israel could remove Netanyahu while leaving the Netanyahu system intact, as many of his opponents object to his attacks on institutions and alliance with the far right but do not necessarily oppose Netanyahuism.
Several rival Israeli leaders remain reluctant to endorse Palestinian statehood or explain what political future they envisage for millions of Palestinians living under Israeli control. Israel could replace its prime minister without replacing his policies, and the tone might soften, relations with Washington might improve, and pressure on the judiciary might ease. However, the occupation, settlement expansion, and preference for indefinite conflict management could continue, which matters for the entire Middle East as the region undergoes a major transformation.
The region is pursuing economic diversification, technological development, and more flexible relations with great powers. Israel could play an important role in this emerging order, particularly with Saudi-Israeli normalisation, which might reshape the region more profoundly than the earlier Abraham Accords. However, Netanyahuism seeks normalisation with Saudi Arabia while resisting a credible pathway towards Palestinian statehood, which is no longer plausible today. Arab governments might maintain discreet security cooperation or limited economic ties with Israel, but a durable regional order cannot rest on the permanent exclusion of the Palestinians.
Key points
- Netanyahuism may survive Netanyahu, posing an obstacle to genuine peace between Israel and the Palestinians.
- The doctrine of Netanyahuism believes Israel can enjoy security without resolving the Palestinian question.
- Israel's next elections will formally determine who governs Israel, but their real significance lies in whether Israelis are prepared to reconsider a doctrine that promised security through permanent control but instead delivered recurring war and deepening isolation.
