Somalia's federal government was established in 2013 after years of peace and reconciliation talks, held in the context of a famine in 2011 and the rise of militant Islam in the form of al-Shabaab. It was the first permanent central government in Somalia since the start of the civil war in 1991. Despite its establishment, the federal government still has limited reach and authority, and al-Shabaab is still entrenched. The country's political elites at federal and state levels are seen to be corrupt and at odds with each other.
Research has shown that Somalia has settled into a situation that brings questionable benefits to the majority of the public, exploits displaced people, and positions al-Shabaab as a credible alternative to the official government. The country's business-political elites and al-Shabaab continue to profit from the current situation, while large proportions of the population see little benefit or, in the case of internally displaced people, see aid diverted. The control of movement – goods and people – by different political authorities and the control, mismanagement, and manipulation of international aid are two key themes that stand out.
Somalia has the second-longest coastline in Africa, about 3,000km, with major and minor seaports and landing beaches acting as both avenues and chokepoints for international trade. The main export is livestock, while imports include food, electrical and electronic goods, clothes, and construction materials. Taxes are extracted at entry points, including Berbera, Bosasso, Mogadishu, and Kismayo ports, and on interior roads. These taxes, formal and informal, make up a big part of the revenue generated in the country.
The recipients of these revenues include the federal government, the more autonomous federal member states – notably Jubbaland and Puntland – and al-Shabaab. This enables all these players to continue as they are. Research has shown that control over chokepoints has been central to political power in Somalia and shapes alliances between local elites and external actors like Ethiopia and Kenya.
Somalia receives significant amounts of international aid for humanitarian, development, and security needs. Since 2010, Overseas Development Aid has averaged US$1.6 billion annually, reaching approximately US$2.5 billion in 2024. However, the aid is channelled through project contracts that are highly susceptible to aid diversion and corruption. One of the worst forms is the exploitation of internally displaced people, who are some of the main recipients of assistance.
The core issue is the lack of acknowledgement that aid is diverted systematically. The result is that external aid givers advance their own priorities but do not fully acknowledge or systematically address their role in the diversion of resources that sustain this predatory system. The losers in this arrangement are the general population, with many seeing al-Shabaab as a credible alternative to the official government leadership, incumbent or opposition.
International donors must not just engage with elites but identify, engage with, and support inclusive Somali-led dialogue processes. Engagement must create space for diverse voices and interests across society, including al-Shabaab, and hear what civic networks, women's groups, business communities, and religious scholars have to say. The humanitarian system is in a global reset, driven by aid cuts, and in Somalia, this reset must include acknowledgement of systemic barriers to change and address some of its perverse internal incentives that continue to enable corruption and aid diversion.
Key points
- Somalia's federal government has limited reach and authority, and al-Shabaab remains entrenched.
- The country's business-political elites and al-Shabaab continue to profit from the current situation, while large proportions of the population see little benefit.
- International donors must engage with diverse Somali voices and interests to address systemic barriers to change.
