A recent fibre cable cut in Ghana's northern regions highlights the need for a robust telecommunications resilience plan. On September 26, 2026, the National Communications Authority (NCA) reported disruptions to voice and data services across five northern regions and parts of Oti. The incident, caused by multiple fibre cuts affecting three transmission routes, disrupted 2G, 3G, and 4G services. The NCA announced restoration of services the same day, following repairs by the National Information Technology Agency and network operators.
The repair teams have been credited for their swift response, but experts argue that a more serious examination of how essential communications can continue during infrastructure damage is needed. A second route must offer a different way to transmit data, rather than simply providing an alternative that is also affected by the same failure. This requires a thorough assessment of the network layout and the underlying infrastructure to ensure that separate connections do not share the same vulnerabilities.
The NCA's Communications Industry Report for 2023 recorded 751 fibre cuts across four domestic fibre operators, citing road construction, private development, utility work, and fire as main causes. To prevent such damage, coordination beyond telecoms is necessary. Road agencies, local authorities, utilities, and contractors need reliable information about buried infrastructure before excavation begins. A practical notification process and verified utility checks can help prevent damage and speed up repairs.
A realistic resilience plan must also identify what remains available when capacity is reduced. Emergency coordination and selected health facilities may need protected minimum connectivity even when ordinary traffic cannot run at its usual speed. Hospitals and other critical institutions should identify their essential communications and agree on recovery arrangements with their providers. The technical answer will vary by location, but physically diverse fibre remains the high-capacity foundation.
Microwave or satellite connections may provide useful backup for selected services, but they must have adequate capacity, dependable power, and tested switching arrangements. Procurement should ask a more demanding question than whether a supplier offers a backup link. Which failure can that link survive, how much traffic can it carry, and how quickly can users switch to it? A cheaper connection that shares the same point of failure may offer little additional protection.
The World Bank's guidance on resilient telecommunications supports a risk-based approach, combining network design with monitoring, backups, emergency planning, and incident reporting. Investment decisions should reflect local conditions and the consequences of failure. Installing every possible backup everywhere would be neither affordable nor necessary. A focused assessment of northern connectivity is proposed, led by the NCA, working with NITA, operators, and relevant infrastructure agencies.
The assessment should establish where shared risks exist, what essential services can continue during major failures, and which improvements would deliver the greatest benefit for their cost. The outcome should be a prioritised plan with named responsibilities and completion dates. A public summary could report restoration performance, backup-testing progress, and completion of corrective actions without exposing sensitive technical details. Institutions purchasing connectivity should use those lessons to strengthen their own continuity plans.
Key points
- Ghana needs a robust plan to maintain connectivity during fibre cable failures.
- A focused assessment of northern connectivity is proposed to identify shared risks and essential services.
- Investment decisions should reflect local conditions and the consequences of failure.
