The Iranian crisis has presented a challenge to China's growing influence in the Middle East, as the country seeks to balance its relationships with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states. According to Ahmed Kandil, Deputy Director of the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, China's influence has been built through trade, energy purchases, infrastructure, investment, and diplomatic access. However, the real test of China's influence comes when one partner's actions threaten the security and interests of others.
China has been Iran's principal economic lifeline, with over 80% of Iran's seaborne oil exports going to China in 2025. Chinese commercial channels have also helped Tehran convert part of its oil revenues into goods, machinery, and industrial supplies outside conventional dollar-based banking networks. However, this relationship has created a dilemma for China, as it is also a major commercial and energy partner of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. The Iranian crisis has therefore raised questions about China's ability to convert its economic weight into effective political leverage.
The crisis has led to Saudi Arabia reportedly asking Beijing to press Tehran to restrain the Houthis after their attacks threatened Saudi territory, energy infrastructure, and Red Sea navigation. China has subsequently urged Iran privately to use its influence over the Yemeni movement. According to Reuters, the Saudi appeal reflected mounting concern over Bab Al-Mandab and the wider network of energy routes on which both Gulf exporters and China depend.
China has moved cautiously from general appeals for restraint towards a specific demand intended to alter a partner's behavior. However, the relationship between Tehran and the Houthis is complex, with Iran providing political support, weaponry, expertise, and coordination, while the Houthis retain autonomy rooted in their Yemeni agenda. Even if Tehran accepts Beijing's message, it may not be able or willing to guarantee compliance.
Chinese leverage must therefore pass through two uncertain stages: Beijing must first influence Iran, and Iran must then influence the Houthis. Diplomatic access does not ensure either outcome, while economic dependence does not automatically produce political obedience. China possesses powerful economic instruments, including the ability to reduce purchases of Iranian oil, demand deeper discounts, slow payments, restrict commercial intermediaries, postpone investments, or tighten scrutiny of the arrangements through which Iranian revenues are converted into Chinese goods.
However, excessive pressure could weaken a useful partner, push Iran closer to Russia, or provoke Tehran into demonstrating that it will not accept treatment as a subordinate actor. Beijing is therefore more likely to apply calibrated pressure, combining private warnings with selective incentives and making de-escalation more profitable without publicly humiliating Iran. This approach highlights the crucial difference between mediation and a security guarantee.
China can perform the role of mediator, but it has not shown the willingness or developed the regional machinery required to assume the role of security guarantor across the Gulf and Red Sea. Its economic leverage may bring parties to the negotiating table, but it cannot substitute for the bases, intelligence networks, defense arrangements, and rapid-deployment capabilities underpinning the American security role.
Key points
- China's influence in the Middle East is being tested by the Iranian crisis.
- Beijing struggles to balance its relationships with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states.
- China's economic leverage may not be enough to guarantee compliance from Iran or the Houthis.
